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Abstract: Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from 
firms. Corruption flourished in the Suharto, pre-democracy era. This paper asks whether local 
democratization that occurred after Suharto reduced corruption and whether specific local politics, over and 
above the effects of local culture, affect corruption. We have a firm level data set for 2001 that benchmarks 
bribing activity and harassment at the time when Indonesia decentralized key responsibilities to local 
democratically elected governments. We have a second data set for 2004 on corruption at the end of the 
first democratic election cycle. We find that, overall, corruption declines between these time periods. But 
specific politics matter. Islamic parties in Indonesia are perceived as being anti-corruption. Our data show 
voting patterns reflect this belief and voters’ perceptions have some degree of accuracy. In the first 
democratic election, localities that voted in legislatures dominated by secular parties, including Megawati’s 
party, experienced significant relative increases in corruption, while the reverse was the case for those 
voting in Islamic parties. But in the second election in 2004, in those localities where corruption had 
increased under secular party rule, voters “threw the bums out of office” and voted in Islamic parties.  
 
In 1999 Indonesia democratized; and in 2001 with fiscal decentralization, local 
democracy took full flight. Democratization was imposed on a regime which in the late 1990’s 
was ranked consistently as among the most corrupt in the world (Bardhan, 1997 and Mocan, 
2004). A significant portion of corruption occurs at the local level, where local government 
officials collect bribes to supplement their salaries: at the time of decentralization in 2001, our 
data indicate that bribes paid to local officials averaged 6% of costs for manufacturing firms. This 
paper examines two key questions. Did democratization with decentralization reduce (or increase) 
corruption at the local level per se? Second, do specific politics in the form of local legislature 
composition matter? With democratization, corruption in Indonesia has become a commanding 
political issue, manifested in exposés in the press, indictments, and political campaigns (McLeod, 
2005). Our key finding will be that districts which voted in greater proportions of Islamic party 
representatives to the local assembly experienced much greater reductions in corruption. While 
the results are specific to local governments in Indonesia, they hint at broader implications for the 
effect of democratization on corruption and the role of Islamic parties in political processes.  
We start with the nature of politics in Indonesia and the timing of political events and our 
surveys. In 1999 Indonesia held nation-wide elections, where local as well as national assemblies 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge support of the National Science Foundation (SES 0416840), which made this 
project possible. We thank Ifa Isfandiarni of the University of Indonesia for her diligent and careful 
supervision of the survey and participation in survey design. Ben Olken provided helpful comments on 
issues of culture versus politics and Pedro Dal Bó, Ross Levine and Sandy Henderson provided helpful 
comments on a preliminary draft of the paper. 
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were elected. The share of representatives of each party in local assemblies is proportional to their 
share of the vote in local elections. Local assemblies were elected in 1999 in anticipation of 
decentralization in January 2001, which occurred as planned with key governmental functions 
such as education and administration of many national regulations being turned over to the local 
district (kabupaten) governments, bypassing provincial governments. Kabupaten in Indonesia are 
similar to USA counties, but with full responsibilities for local services.  
Under current laws, all local parties must be national parties. In 1999 there were 5 (out of 
a total of 40) major political parties, 2 of which are secular—GOLKAR, the former ruling party 
under Suharto, and Megawati’s PDIP party. These two parties play a key role in our analysis. 
Other significant parties have Islamic roots and are viewed as less accepting of corruption than 
secular parties. While the dominant Islamic party, PKB, has not made corruption its national 
platform issue, our fieldwork suggests that it is viewed as substantially less corrupt at the local 
level than secular parties. Another Islamic party (PKS) has emerged as a major party on an anti-
corruption platform focused on corruption associated with the secular parties. The 1999 national 
elections led initially to a coalition government between Megawati’s secular party, PDIP, and the 
main Islamic party, PKB, with the first President, Abdurachman Wahid, drawn from PKB.  
Our first survey took place in fall 2001, benchmarking corruption at the dawn of 
decentralization, or full local democratization (Kuncoro, 2003, World Bank, 2003). But 2001 also 
was the year when the national coalition between PKB and Megawati’s PDIP party fell apart, 
with Megawati taking over as President, after Wahid was impeached. After that, at the local level, 
PDIP often aligned with the other major secular party, GOLKAR. Our second survey was carried 
out in early 2005 and covers information on corruption in 2004. In late 2004, the Megawati 
period ended with the direct election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as President, following the 
second round of elections (in a five year election cycle) of representatives to national and local 
assemblies. We observe that local government corruption drops substantially between 2001 and 
2004. We link that reduction to decentralized democracy, not with Megawati assuming office, 
since Megawati’s party during 2001-2004 was associated with corruption, in line with results 
from our data. However we note that we don’t know for certain what happened between the fall 
of Suharto in 1998 and 2001. A prevailing view is that from 1998-2001, it was “business as 
usual” (Kuncoro, 2003, World Bank, 2003), but our results are specific to the 2001-2004 interval. 
Why would a regime switch to local democracy matter? While legislative measures can 
potentially affect corruption (Olken, 2005), in Indonesia there haven’t been significant new 
legislative measures (World Bank 2003, Chapter 3). But there is greater enforcement of existing 
laws, in a context where corruption is now a major political issue. In the new, democratic era, 
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under a freer press, newspapers write exposés (Brunetti and Wider, 2003); young and ambitious 
local prosecutors make reputations through official investigations and indictments; firms and 
local offices of the national chamber of commerce can lobby legislators to protect firms from 
harassment and to discipline local officials; and local political parties may gain votes with anti-
corruption stances. As part of this process the national government created several anti-corruption 
agencies and commissions. A further element is that with decentralization, elected officials may 
try to deter corruption to attract local investment, in the context of inter-jurisdictional competition 
for firms (Brueckner and Saavendra, 2001, Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004, Fisman and Gatti , 
2002 and Mocan, 2005). In terms of regime switches, the economics literature discusses the 
notion of multiple equilibria under corruption (Cadot 1987, Andvig and Moene, 1991, Tirole 
1996, Bardham 1997), based on information asymmetries, intergenerational reputation modeling, 
or punishments versus rewards when corrupt officials are few versus many.  
Our notion of the effect of the regime switch follows Mookerjee and Png (1995), who 
analyze the effects of increasing punishments of corrupt officials. Significant increases in 
punishment deter bribe solicitation and amounts, especially in a context like Indonesia where the 
firms being solicited may turn officials in. With expanded opportunities for redress, officials may 
reduce bribe demands, so firms find it cheaper to pay the bribe than make the effort to seek 
redress. In addition, democratization may induce a change in the local corruption environment, 
through greater local social sanctions against corruption with more public scrutiny of illicit 
activity and firm owners increasingly refusing to pay bribes. While we associate corruption 
reductions at the local level with decentralized democracy, there is always a problem of 
separating regime switch effects from effects of unobserved changes in other accompanying 
conditions. Thus much of our focus will be on the effects of specific local politics—the impacts 
on corruption of legislature composition in the competitive political environment. 
Why might local assembly composition matter (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2003)? In Indonesia, 
opportunities for redress are related to whether local assembly representatives support corruption 
reduction. We hypothesize that redress opportunities for firms and the direct and indirect 
punishment costs for corrupt officials rise and the level of corruption declines as the proportion of 
district representatives from Islamic parties rises. Direct punishment costs include dealing with 
complaints, indictments of an official or their boss, loss of job, or hindering of career 
advancement. Indirect costs include local social sanctions faced by corruption officials, where the 
local corruption environment may be affected by the attitude towards corruption within the local 
assembly. Moreover career law enforcement officials may feel freer to pursue corruption cases at 
the local level with the political backing offered by Islamic representatives. An objection to the 
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idea that Islamic parties deter corruption is that the cross-country literature argues that Islamic 
countries are more corrupt (e.g., Mocan, 2004). That fact is difficult to disentangle from the fact 
that they are generally also much less democratic and ruled by secular regimes, with a less 
developed “rule of law”; and it says little about within country effects of religious and political 
differences across regions.  
The real difficulty in evaluating the role of Islamic parties is to disentangle local 
assembly composition effects from the effects on bribe solicitation of “local culture”. There are 
two distinct, not well correlated aspects to district culture: devoutness of the population and the 
corruption environment at the time of democratization. Our fieldwork suggests that today devout 
Muslims are distinctly less willing to pay bribes; and, ceteris paribus, some sects of devout 
Muslims are more inclined to vote for Islamic parties. But if devoutness affects bribing and vote 
choices, that makes the role of Islamic parties more difficult to assess, regardless of whether they 
are taking anti-corruption stances as strategic political choices or as an expression of their own 
devoutness. One needs to disentangle whether corruption differences across districts occur 
because of differences in Islamic parties’ representation in local assemblies or differences in 
devoutness of voters. Although this is an obvious problem to worry about in identifying assembly 
composition effects, when we turn to discussing our identification strategy, the more difficult 
problem will concern the prevailing local corruption environment at the time of decentralization. 
Our data suggest this environment was unrelated to measures reflecting local devoutness. But 
there is still the identification problem that districts which for idiosyncratic reasons had a history 
of more corruption may have a different, unobserved attitude towards bribing that also is 
correlated with their voting behavior.  
Our surveys are constructed to elicit information about bribing activity involving local 
officials. We are not focused on the other major forms of corruption—bribes paid to reduce 
corporate income tax liabilities, issuance of FDI or export/import licenses for large firms, and 
police extortion. All these involve national officials; and the first two mostly very large firms. We 
are focused on day-to-day corruption involving local officials that eats away at almost all firms.  
 
1. Red Tape, Harassment, and Bribes 
 
What is the nature of local corruption? In Indonesia, firms are required to obtain a variety of 
locally set licenses and “retributions”. Officials from the local Ministry of Industry monitor firms 
to make sure they have the full array of licenses and that all are up-to-date. Officials from the 
local Ministry of Labor inspect licenses and equipment in connection with safety regulation. 
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Visiting plants purportedly to inspect and monitor is the basic form of harassment used by 
officials to elicit bribe payments. The creation of red tape through licensing has a long history in 
Indonesia, with efforts in the mid-1990’s by the central government (encouraged by the World 
Bank) to curtail the array of licenses in order to encourage foreign and domestic investment. 
However, immediately following the national decentralization legislation in 1999, localities, in 
anticipation of decentralization in 2001, felt empowered to create a greater array of licenses and 
retributions, with sharper limits on the time licenses are valid before needing renewal.   
Firms pay bribes for several reasons. When a license is up for renewal, bribes reduce 
waiting time to renewal and harassment when a license has expired. Bribes are paid to get 
officials out of the plant who are there in the guise of inspecting licenses and ensuring equipment 
safety. Similarly bribes are paid to placate officials, who claim a plant needs a license that in fact 
is not required. Since 2001, empowered by a national “pro-labor” ministerial directive which 
greatly strengthened the application of pro-labor laws, other bribes (which we record separately) 
to local labor officials are paid by firms to resolve disputes over severance and overtime pay in 
their favor and to have strikes declared illegal (albeit in an open shop environment). While this is 
a separate source of bribe activity, it feeds into the first, since inspection of licenses and 
equipment safety allows labor officials to sniff around plants for hints of labor troubles.   
One could categorize this bribe activity to reduce the harassment from regulations under 
the efficient grease hypothesis (Liu 1985, Becker and Maher 1986, Bardhan 1997, and Cai, Fang, 
and Xu 2005), with the caveat, however, that localities are imposing regulations, so local officials 
can demand bribes (e.g., Banerjee, 1994, and Kaufman and Wei, 1998). Harassment is costly 
because it takes up the entrepreneur and her managers’ time (Kaufman and Wei, 1999, Svennson, 
2003, and Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004). In Henderson and Kuncoro (2004) we argue that, on 
the eve of decentralization in 2001, bribes were part of compensation packages of local officials. 
Corruption was greater in localities that had limited fiscal resources, with bribes being a form of 
indirect taxation to supplement the salaries of local officials and bring them up to competitive 
market wages.2  
                                                 
2 Both before and after decentralization, localities received most of their revenues as transfers 
from the central government, with localities having little de facto independent means of raising revenue. 
The fiscal situations are detailed in Henderson and Kuncoro (2004). Since decentralization, the fiscal 
situation is in flux, with new spending responsibilities of local governments, new sources of transfers with 
formulas undergoing on-going adjustment, and new developing sources of local revenues, in particular a 
sales tax. Moreover the imposition of local democracy and the development of local anti-corruption 
campaigns have changed the whole environment, as discussed above. 
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To motivate the empirical analysis we discuss a very simple model. Firms and local 
officials who harass them each have their own optimization problem. Firms seek to maximize 
profits where  
 max ,
( , ( , , , ))
where 0; 0; , 0; 0.
i j i ij ij i ij j i i
X b
X h v l b
p y X h v l b W X b
y y h h h
θΠ = − −
> < > <
  (1) 
In equation (1), firm  faces a price, ,  ji p for its product sold in locality j. Its output y is produced 
with inputs chosen by the firm, iX , at prices, jW  in district j; but output is reduced by 
harassment, ( )h ⋅ , experienced by the firm, which takes up the entrepreneur’s time and may create 
discontent in the factory. ( )h ⋅  is specified as a “black-box” process that involves some 
underlying game (Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004) . But the outcome, ( )h ⋅ , is declining in bribes, 
ib , offered by the firm to make officials leave and is increasing in (costly) visits, ijv , by officials 
in district j to firm i. Harassment is increasing in red tape, or licenses and retributions, ijl , 
required by district j of firm i. Finally there is a vector of observed and unobserved items 
affecting harassment, ,ijθ such as how adept the entrepreneur is at dealing with local officials, 
idiosyncratic greed of local officials, religious convictions of the entrepreneur, socio-political 
climate in the district, and redress opportunities available to firms that face bribe demands. 
 Optimizing with respect to choice of bribes, bribes are censored at zero if ( ) ( ) 1h by h⋅ ⋅ <  at 
0ib = ; and bribes are given by the implicit function from ( ) ( ) 1 0h by h⋅ ⋅ − =  so that   
 ( , , , , ).j i ij ij ijb b p X l v θ=                                   (2) 
We expect the level of bribes to be increasing in and v l ; but ensuring that in the model requires 
restrictions on the functions such as , 0, , 0.hh bb bl bvy h h h≥ ≤  
 For local officials, their choice of number of visits is based on the optimization problem 
                            
  max [ ( )] ( , , , , )ij ij ij i ijv E b c v l d e ε⋅ − ,                    (3)  
for ( )b ⋅ given in (2). ijd is vector of items affecting the cost of officials’ visits such as the distance 
from the officials’ location in jurisdiction j (the district capital) to firm i; ie  is any characteristics 
of the firm (over and above ijl ) which legitimately require officials to visit the firm; and ijε are 
other aspects that affect the costs of visits, such as censure from local legislators concerning 
harassment or the extent to which local officials “are expected” to make up salary deficits from 
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competitive wages through bribes. From the first order condition [ ( )] ( ) 0v vE b c⋅ − ⋅ = , we can 
specify a visit equation   
 ( , , , , , )ij ij ij i i ij ijv v l d e X ε θ= .            (4) 
  
 We estimate equations based on (2) and (4) in the last sections of the paper. In doing so, 
one issue is what firm characteristics can be treated as exogenous. It is clear in (2), that from (4), 
ijv is endogenous, where potentially either ijd or elements of not in i ie X in (4) can be used as 
instruments in estimation of (2). However, what about ,  or even ij il X , especially given the notion 
that officials impose red tape to generate bribes?  We follow two approaches in estimation. In the 
first, while we treat visits as endogenous, we assume, red tape, ijl , is pre-determined before the 
regime switch in 2001 by (a) the industry the firm is in, (b) regulations enacted in districts in late 
1999 and 2000, and (c) firm size at the time these regulations were introduced. In this version, 
one problem is that our instruments for ijv are weak. Another is that firm licensing and retribution 
requirements may not be strictly pre-determined. But we only have weak instruments for these 
measures as well, because, in any district, licenses are determined by firm characteristics that also 
may affect bribes and visits and we have no cross district measures that adequately explain cross 
district variation in licenses in 2004.3  
Our second approach is a reduced form one, where we replace ijl and ijv by their 
determinants, which are mostly firm characteristics; and focus just on the overall effect of politics 
on bribe activity—both the direct effect and any indirect effect through visits and license 
requirements. Our primary results involve this reduced form approach. For bribes, the reduced 
form is  
    ( , , , , ),j i i ij ijb b p X e d θ= ?   (5) 
where ijθ? contains observed and unobserved local political-cultural considerations affecting bribe 
activity. Finally we also worry about whether firm characteristics, iX , are affected by local 
cultural and political conditions; and, while we do not have strong instruments to predict these,  
we experiment with certain even more reduced form specifications. 
                                                 
3 In 2001, licenses were more connected to fiscal circumstances and a district’s need for revenues to pay 
employee compensation through bribes received (Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004). 
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  The remaining econometric issue concerns how to identify the role of politics, aspects of 
which are observed, separate from the local culture, which is largely unobserved. We state our 
identification strategy after we discuss our data and the context in more detail.  
 
2. Data, Specifications, and Econometric Issues. 
 
 We utilize two corruption surveys. In the first conducted in late 2001, a team under Ari 
Kuncoro chose a random sample of 1808 enterprises in 64 districts on Java and other major 
islands of Indonesia. The survey environment was carefully constructed, using qualified locals as 
interviewers (dialect and social issues).4 The key questions concerned the fraction of costs 
devoted to bribes paid to local officials to “smooth business operations” and the main forms of 
red tape, in particular the number of business licenses (locally set and issued) required of each 
firm in their particular district. Licenses may be required to start a business, export, make noise, 
create congestion, pollute in different dimensions, operate particular kinds of machinery, and so 
on. The mean number of licenses per firm (including service and retail firms) was 5.8 and the 
standard deviation 5. There were a number of qualitative questions. One concerned the 
difficulties firms have with “retributions and levies” required to operate an escalator, water pump, 
generator, and the like. Another concerned a then relatively new phenomenon—difficulties with 
labor troubles. On firm characteristics, fieldwork strongly indicates that firms are cagey, willing 
to reveal bribe information under appropriate interview circumstances, but unwilling at the same 
time to then reveal much detailed economic information. In the first survey, firm size was 
measured by sales in discrete categories. These data are analyzed in Henderson and Kuncoro 
(2004).  
 For this paper, as noted, the 2001 survey provides a benchmark on the degree of 
corruption at the time of decentralization. In early 2005 we conducted a second survey to assess 
corruption in 2004. The second survey differed in aspects of sample design and questions. It 
covered only manufacturing firms and it covered only and all of Java. 2707 firms were 
interviewed. While there are 105 districts in Java, 2 are essentially national parks and 6 have 
                                                 
4 In the Indonesian political context, in more remote areas, the team sometimes recruited a representative 
from the (non-governmental) local chamber of commerce to accompany surveyors to interviews to help 
stimulate an Indonesian “conversation among friends”, so firms were more forthcoming in revealing bribe 
information. Local offices of the chamber of commerce in the Suharto era played a complex role. Apart 
from a primary function of promoting local business, they also provided an outlet for local political 
discontent about government policy and practices among business owners. Compared to other parts of 
Indonesia, on Java where the current work is focused, less use of these representatives was made in 2001, 
and little use was made in the 2004 survey work.  
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almost no manufacturing. These second 6 are integrated into surrounding areas to define 97 
districts that we look at. In terms of overlap with the first survey, overlap occurs for 37 districts 
and 178 firms (in 24 of those districts). Finally the second survey is not entirely random. We 
over-sampled in districts with low populations of firms with a target of a minimum of 20 
responses per district5 and we over-sampled in 3-4 districts with large numbers of original firms, 
in order to increase firm sample overlap.  
 The survey for 2004 asked specifically about the number of “levies and retributions” a 
firm faces (mean of 2.6), as well as the number of licenses (mean of 6.4). Besides bribes to local 
officials “to smooth business operations” affected by red tape, which we call “red tape” bribes, 
we asked a second bribe question about bribes paid to local labor officials in dealing with strikes, 
severance terms, minimum wages, and over time pay, which we call “labor bribes”. As we will 
see, the first type of bribe declined significantly between 2001 and 2004, while the second 
(presumed to be new since 2001) made up some portion of the difference. One could interpret this 
in a Shleifer and Vishny (1993) framework as competition between labor and industry ministry 
officials leading to a division of bribes associated with industrial activities. But the presumption 
is that more bribes will be generated in this circumstance. There are more officials to harass firms 
and complementary dimensions on which to harass; labor officials sniffing around for labor 
troubles can incidentally also harass firms over licensing and safety.  
In the second survey we sought more detailed economic data, getting “exact” firm 
employment and recording sales and capital stock information in interval form. In asking bribe 
questions, we worked with the surveyors to distinguish between firms who truly paid zero bribes, 
versus firms who were uncomfortable providing an answer (only 73 out of 2707 firms). Finally in 
2005 we asked the “exact” number of visits made by local officials to the plant in 2004, a variable 
we interpret as the key form of harassment. 
Specifications and econometric issues 
 In estimation, we focus on two relationships—bribes which firms decide to pay and visits 
which local officials decide to make. For bribes, our measure is bribes as a share of costs—in 
principle equation (2) or (5) divided by the cost function for the firm. Experimentation suggested 
a very simple form: 
      1 2 ijbribe/costs ( ) ln(no. licenses+retributions)+ ln(no. of visits)+ ( )+i jC X P Zβ β η= +         (6) 
The ( )iC X  function captures cost effects and any firm-specific bribe related characteristics, such 
as whether the owner is a Chinese Indonesian, traditionally subject to more harassment. ( )jP Z  
                                                 
5 The lowest number in our 97 districts is 16. 
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relates to political conditions which might signal resistance to making bribes or unwillingness to 
press for them. ijη represents unmeasured components of local tastes, the political process, local 
officials, and entrepreneurs. In (6) we lump the count of licenses and retributions together; 
separately they give similar results. The visits equation has a similar form as we will see later; 
and the issues for estimation of the two are similar.  
In general we estimate equation (6) by a Tobit specification, treating zero bribe responses 
as a censoring problem. This seemed the simplest and a commonly accepted approach. We will 
also report 2SLS results on key specifications; and later in the section on robustness we report 
separate discrete-continuous choice results. Estimation does not account for selectivity in location 
decisions: the effect of corruption on where firms locate. For example, firms adept at dealing with 
local officials may be more willing to choose corrupt areas. We do not have the data to model 
selection but we believe it is not an issue.  In our data, the 2001 regime switch leaves relative 
bribing activity in districts in 2001 and 2004 uncorrelated (see later). That would suggest most 
firm locations, characteristics, and license requirements are determined prior to the conditions 
driving 2004 harassment-bribe activity in districts. Only 5% of our firms were born after 2001 
(and dropping them does not change results). 
Political Variables. 
The key econometric issue involves political variables. We hypothesize that greater local 
assembly shares of representatives from the secular parties, PDIP and GOLKAR, in the Megawati 
era positively affect bribing. Results where we replace PDIP-GOLKAR by the share of votes held 
by the key “anti-corruption” Islamic parties, PKB and PKS, mirror the ones we get, given the two 
are highly negatively correlated (-0.70). We choose the PDIP-GOLKAR share simply because we 
have direct instruments for votes for these two parties (see below).  
As noted above, the identification issue is that greater representation from PDIP-
GOLKAR may be correlated either with voters’ personal tastes concerning corruption related to 
devoutness or with the local corruption environment. The local corruption environment involving 
bureaucrats and local firms in 2001 is not related to devoutness measures, but arises from more 
idiosyncratic aspects of district history and administration. Our key measure of local devoutness 
is the ratio of Islamic to state elementary schools in a district in 1990, reflecting religious 
attitudes of voters in 1999. That taste measure has a zero correlation coefficient (-.01) with the 
initial corruption environment, measured by average bribe activity in 2001,6 but is strongly 
                                                 
6 We also have another measure of devoutness, the ratio of small prayer-houses to mosques. In devout areas 
where people want to do regular daily devotions, rather than commute repeatedly to the mosque in the 
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correlated with PDIP-GOLKAR vote shares (-.38).7 As we will see, areas which voted more 
heavily for PDIP-GOLKAR in 1999 tended to have initially relatively lower levels of corruption 
(-.20). It may be that in high corruption areas people were already prepared to vote Islamic in the 
hope of changing the local environment; or it may be in less corrupt areas, people were more 
willing to vote for secular parties, not perceiving corruption as such an issue. For the latter, voters 
in these areas were then subsequently “surprised” by an increase in corruption relative to other 
areas, after 2001. We will present data which suggest that districts that “were cheated on” and 
experienced increases in corruption then voted against secular parties in 2004. All this discussion 
means that PDIP-GOLKAR vote shares are correlated with unobserved aspects of local culture 
that affect bribing and we need instruments that are unrelated to both devoutness and the initial 
corruption environment.  
Instruments draw upon aspects of Java history and culture (Liddle, 1999 and Vatikiotis, 
1998). The first deals with voter views on the role of Islam in politics per se, which affect party 
vote, but are separable from devoutness or the initial corruption climate. On Java, there are 
abangan and santri Muslims, both of whom may be equally devout (i.e., potentially opposed to 
corruption). But abangan are less traditional and orthodox, historically having incorporated in 
home practices aspects from Buddhism and Hinduism (two religions that at different times 
dominated parts of Java). The distinction in terms of religious practices and identification of who 
is santri versus abangan is blurred today with a general increase in religiosity over the last 30 
years; and decades ago santri Muslims broke into two groups: traditional (more rural) and reform, 
where the latter favored a more individual interpretation of the Quran. For us there are two key 
distinctions: (i) abangan Muslims are more averse to the existence of Islamic parties, to 
incorporating Islam into politics, and, thus, to voting for Islamic parties; and (ii) they tend to live 
in non-coastal areas, more in the hinterland of Central and East Java where Buddhism and 
Hinduism once flourished. So the first instrument for vote share is the fraction of population in 
2000 in a district living in villages that are on the coast (noting Java is a long, narrow island), 
indicating populations that are more willing to vote for Islamic parties, independent of the local 
corruption environment or devoutness.8  
For other instruments, one of the secular parties, GOLKAR, draws strength from (mostly 
former) government employees, who worked for the Suharto regime in 1990 and out of loyalty 
                                                                                                                                                 
village center, they build small prayer-houses nearby to reduce their “commuting costs” and, perhaps also, 
to signal their devotion. The simple correlation coefficient between bribes in 2001 and prayer-houses is .10. 
7 Correlation coefficients are calculated with district level data where the sample is 87 if avg. bribe activity 
in 2001 is not one of the variables and 30 otherwise. 
8 The simple correlation coefficients of percent living in coastal villages with PDIP-GOLKAR, avg. bribe 
ratio in 2001, and the devoutness measure are -.34, .063, and .13 respectively.  
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tend still to vote for GOLKAR. This very small fraction (1.9%) of the population is a strong 
instrument for GOLKAR and seems corruption neutral, meaning (i) that it is not correlated with 
bribing (is not a significant regressor on its own, does not significantly affect the coefficient on 
the PDIP-GOLKAR variable, and has a simple correlation coefficient with initial bribe activity of 
-.086) and (ii) specification tests on orthogonality of residuals to instruments pass readily.9 
Finally, for instruments, PDIP is partially an outgrowth of an amalgam of parties forced in the 
Suharto era, which included the traditional Christian parties. While the numbers are small 
(average 4.3%), the fraction of the population that is Christian in 1995 is a strong instrument for 
PDIP vote share in 1999. The fraction Christian noticeably raises Sargan values in specification 
tests on certain formulations or appears as a significant covariate in some ordinary Tobit 
formulations, noticeably affecting the coefficient on PDIP-GOLKAR variable (although not our 
base case in Table 5 below).10 In general we rely on just the first two instruments.  
As we will detail later in the section on robustness, we experiment directly with adding 
controls for district devoutness, including the Islamic school measure. In IV estimation these 
measures do not play a significant role, so we don’t focus on them here. But there is one element 
of the local political process we haven’t discussed. That is the selection of local leaders.  
After democratization in 1999, the local district premiers, or bupati’s, start to be elected 
by local assemblies in time staggered elections (over a 5 year horizon across districts). Before that 
bupati’s were bureaucrats appointed by the center. Starting in late 2004, bupatis as their staggered 
terms end are now elected by direct popular vote. But in the time period we are looking at, they 
were elected by local assemblies. We know the sponsoring party in each assembly of the elected 
bupati. Some bupati’s are the same bureaucrats who held the job before and some are new to the 
position. We think of the position being much like a city manager in the USA appointed by a 
local city council, where some are professionals and some political figures. From simple probit 
analysis, the chances that a selected bupati was sponsored by PDID or GOLGAR is increasing in 
the PDID-GOLKAR vote share in 1999. However there is absolutely no discontinuity in the 
selection process—as, for example, when one or both parties top 50% of the vote or attain a 
plurality. Indonesian politics is strongly affected by the notion of “consensus”, so sharp 
                                                 
9 In the basic ordinary Tobit result in Table 5, column 5 below, the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient (standard 
error) in an ordinary Tobit (with clustered errors) is .0842 (.0369). Adding in the two instruments, changes 
the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient to .0827 (.0417) with coefficients (standard errors) on the percent 
government employee and percent coastal variables of .628 (.418) and -.0316 (.0639) respectively. In the 
basic IV Tobit result in Table 5, column 4, the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient (standard error) is .199 (.0897). 
If we drop the percent government employee as an instrument so the model is just identified the coefficient 
rises to .231 (.0904). 
10 We note its simple correlation coefficient with 2001 avg. bribe is -.36, so it is related to the initial culture 
of corruption. 
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discontinuities may be less likely. Moreover in corruption estimation below, controlling for 
PDIP-GOLKAR vote share, which party sponsored the bupati has no affect on corruption per se. 
While we hoped bupati selection would be an important element in corruption which would allow 
for a regression discontinuity analysis (van der Klaauw, 1999), this possibility did not bear fruit. 
The notion of consensus will be important in thinking about results. PDIP-GOLKAR has 
over 50% of the vote in 71% of our districts, although a single party only holds the majority in 
11% of districts. In 29% of districts, PDIP-GOLKAR has over 60% of the vote and in 13% under 
40%. We will argue that effects are linear in vote share, with no discontinuity such as at 50%. 
The climate of corruption just gets increasingly worse continuously as the secular parties’ 
combined vote shares rise and they increasingly dominate the “consensus”. In the section on 
robustness we will discuss non-linear and discontinuous specifications in detail. 
Finally we note that, in examining political effects, we do not have recorded vote shares 
for all districts. Due to its designation as a national capital region, Jakarta has provincial status 
and a provincial assembly and its 5 districts have no local assemblies. Second, in 5 other of our 
97 districts, votes were not published; generally there was some controversy about the voting in 
those districts. While numbers were released informally at the time to determine legislative 
shares, these shares are not in the public record and so far we have been unable to uncover them. 
Thus identification of legislature composition effects is based on 87 districts.  
 
3. Results: The Effect of Democratization on Corruption, 2001 versus 2004. 
 
 We start by examining changes in corruption between 2001 and 2004, using two over-
time comparisons. One is for 178 firms which overlap in our two time periods: 2001 at the time 
of decentralization, and 2004 at the end of the first election cycle and Megawati’s rule. Second 
we have 37 districts in which we surveyed in both 2001 and 2004. We pool all manufacturing 
firms surveyed in these districts, to compare 2001 and 2004 behaviors. These first exercises show 
us correlations in the data. Towards the end of this section we start to deal with identification of 
causal effects and then in section 4 we focus on trying to establish a causal link between 
corruption and Islamic party shares. 
Individual Firm Differences over Time. 
 Table 1 gives tabulations for the 178 firms which overlap samples. In Table 1 first we 
look at bribing activity connected with red tape. In the comparison, in 2001, people reluctant to 
answer the bribe question were given a zero while for 2004 they were a given a missing value. So 
in the first row we know that a maximum of 128 firms paid bribes in 2004, while in 2001 a 
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minimum of 136 paid bribes. The second line is even more revealing. For those reporting bribes, 
bribes as a share of costs fell dramatically from a mean of 8.0 to 4.5. Continuing down the rows, 
red tape declined modestly (noting in 2001, given the wording of the question many firms did not 
count their license to operate a business per se in the license total). Median time spent with local 
public officials also fell. However we have a new category and new type of bribe in 2004—bribes 
for labor relations that developed because of the national pro-labor ministerial directive issued in 
2001. While relatively fewer firms paid these, for those that do, the bribes were large. Overall, to 
be consistent with 2001 if we count missing values as zeros in 2004, the average bribe ratio of 6.1 
in 2001 declined modestly to 5.8 in 2004 including labor bribes.11 We tried a crude weighting by 
sales size (using mid-points of size categories) to get a weighted average which indicates no 
change. It is clear bribing for red tape declined, but there was now a new source of local bribes, 
potentially restoring much of the difference.12 To get a better sense of what happened, we turn to 
some partial correlations in the data.  
Among our 178 firms, 50 who paid red tape bribes in 2001 reported absolutely zero 
bribes in 2004, while 30 firms which paid no red tape bribes in 2001 reported bribes in 2004. In 
this small sample, for firms reporting bribes in both periods no significant OLS or fixed effect 
results on bribe amounts emerge in statistical analysis although the time effect is noticeably 
negative. Fixed effect Tobits with just two observations per firm are strongly biased. However a 
“conditional” or fixed effects logit identified by firms who switched bribe-no bribe status 
suggests some interesting patterns. Results are given in Table 2, where we separate results for just 
red tape bribes (columns 1 and 2) and then those for red tape and labor bribes combined (columns 
3 and 4). Results are similar. Controlling for firm fixed effects, (changes in) size variables don’t 
seem to matter. However export activity may affect bribes and certainly changes in the number of 
licenses do.  
The key results concern time effects and political parties. There are four districts with no 
recorded political votes and that is controlled for with a dummy variable (here interacted with 
time, as the vote share is). In columns (1) and (3) a time dummy for 2004 is negative indicating, 
ceteris paribus, the likelihood of paying bribes declined between the two time periods. We think 
this is a democratization-decentralization effect. Other changes at the time of the regime switch 
                                                 
11 If we exclude missing values in 2004, the average rises to 6.33 in 2004. 
12 When we first got back questionnaires and saw the drop in red tape bribes and rise in labor ones, we 
worried that some firms may have been confused about the two types of bribes, since both red tape and 
labor bribes may be paid to officials from the local Ministry of Labor (but red tape only to officials from 
the local Ministry of Industry). We then went back out into the field with our lead surveyors and resurveyed 
about 70 firms to make sure there was no confusion; there was none. 
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such as Megawati’s ascension to power and the introduction of labor bribe activity should only 
work to increase corruption, while local democratization per se increases the forums for people to 
protest corrupt behavior and empowers people to say no. In columns 2 and 4, this time effect is 
significantly less in districts which voted more for PDIP-GOLKAR, implying legislature 
composition is correlated with changing bribe activity. While the regime switch reduced the 
probability of paying bribes overall, point estimates suggest the effect could reverse in districts 
with heavy PDIP-GOLKAR support. By 65% vote share for PDIP-GOLKAR, the likelihood of 
bribe activity starts to increase overall between time periods.  
How robust is this PDIP-GOLKAR time effect? Throughout we conduct robustness 
checks, although these are done in more detail in later sections when samples are larger. Here we 
focus on two key ones. The first is to make sure results aren’t explained by correlated changes in 
economic conditions, where perhaps districts that do better economically pay more or less bribes, 
with economic changes potentially being correlated with vote shares. Second bribe responses (as 
opposed to actual activity) could be correlated with firms’ perceptions of the local government, 
where for example if firms are more positive in a district they are less willing to “complain” (i.e., 
report bribes), and perceptions and outcomes may also be related to vote shares. For changes in 
economic conditions we look at GDP per capita in a district, assigning 1999 values to 2001 and 
2003 values to 2004. For perceptions, we ask respondents on a scale of 1 (best) to 6 (worst) how 
they rate the efficiency of local government provision of basic services before and after regional 
autonomy. Here we look at the change in individual responses, assigning to 2001 firms’ 
perceptions before regional autonomy and to 2004 their perceptions after regional autonomy, both 
covered in survey for 2004. Results are in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, for the Table 2, column 4 
formulation, where, given this is a fixed effects logit, we are assessing the effect of time changes 
in covariates. Increases in income and decreases in inefficiency (lowering the value of the 
covariate) are both insignificantly associated with decreases in reported bribes. For each, the 
Table 2 time-PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient of .0830 is little changed at .0965 and .0871 
respectively. We experimented with other attitudinal questions, changes in district average 
attitudinal responses, and other specifications. 13 The results presented are as strong as any, in 
terms of effects on the PDIP-GOLKAR variable.  
                                                 
13 For example, results are similar if we enter a time dummy multiplied by the change in the district average 
efficiency rating in 2001 versus 2004. Then the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient (standard error) is .0783 
(.0294), while the effect on the time dummy of the average attitudinal change is 2.07 (1.37). For income 
done in this fashion (time dummy interacted with the percent change in GDP p.c.), the PDIP-GOLKAR 
coefficient is .0951 (.0314), while the income coefficient is -1.65 (1.53). 
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These logit results are suggestive but the sample size is small and magnitudes from fixed 
effect logit coefficients are difficult to interpret. While the Table 2, column 3 result suggests that 
if the probability of a firm paying a bribe in 2001 was .7, by 2004 that had fallen to .5, we can’t 
anchor initial probabilities. The estimation also assumes that size and license effects are constant 
over time, which may not be the case. To enrich the analysis and expand the sample size for over-
time comparisons, we pool all manufacturing firms in 2001 and 2004 which were surveyed in the 
37 overlapping districts. 
District Level Time Differences  
We start by exploring correlations of vote shares with other measures for 30 districts in 
which we have recorded 1999 vote shares, as well as 2001 and 2004 bribe data. Here we look at 
all bribes: red tape bribes in 2001 and red tape and labor bribes in 2004, so any bribe reductions 
over time are a minimum, based on assuming labor bribes in 2001 are zero everywhere. For the 
30 districts with vote shares recorded, Figure 1a shows that the average (including zeros) bribe 
ratio in 2001 declined with the PDIP-GOLKAR vote share (with a simple correlation coefficient 
of -.20), but rose in 2004 (.37). Correspondingly (which holds for all figures to follow), in Figure 
1b the fraction of firms paying bribes mirrors these same vote-time patterns. If, for these 30 
districts, we regress the change in average bribe ratio on PDIP-GOLKAR vote share in 1999, the 
coefficient (standard error) is .0966 (.0438), indicating how in net bribes changed between the 
time periods in response to vote shares. Adding on either the percent change in district ln (GDP 
p.c.) or the change in perceived district level government inefficiency leaves the PDIP-GOLKAR 
effect unchanged and significant, and both coefficients of these added variables are insignificant.  
The results in Figure 1 support the notion that districts with lower initial corruption were 
more willing to vote for PDIP-GOLKAR, but they paid for their votes with increases in 
corruption, related to how heavily they voted for PDIP-GOLKAR. Figure 2 shows that the 2004 
pattern continues over to all our 87 districts: the average bribe ratio in 2004 rose sharply with 
PDIP-GOLKAR vote share in 1999. Figure 3 shows something else that is also critical to our 
thinking, that decentralization and Megawati’s assent to Presidency was a regime switch. Figure 3 
plots district bribe activity in 2001 versus 2004: rather than there being a 45 degree regression 
line, there is modest negative relationship (-0.14 is the simple correlation coefficient).  
Finally Figure 4 shows a punishment effect, where initially less corrupt districts that 
voted for PDIP-GOLKAR in 1999 and experienced increases in corruption, then voted to “throw 
the bums out of office”. In Figure 4a, we look at the 30 districts with overlapping data and plot 
the 2004-2001 average bribe ratio change against the 2004-1999 vote change. In the second wave 
of elections, districts that experienced high increases in corruption then voted big reductions in 
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PDIP-GOLKAR vote shares. In a footnote to the Figure, we show this correlation is not due to 
mean reversion in voting behavior. After accounting for 1999 vote share levels, increases in bribe 
activity are associated with declines in vote shares for PDIP-GOLKAR (and adding in the percent 
change in GDP p.c. has no effect on the result). Finally, Figure 4b shows for all districts on Java 
that those with low 2004 bribe activity saw little or no change in PDIP-GOLKAR vote shares, 
while those with high bribe activity saw big secular party vote share reductions. This is a 
suggestive sharp correlation in the data.  
To explore these correlations further we then estimated these relationships for the pooled 
sample of 1677 firms (679 from 2001). Results on a Tobit specification to equation (5) are given 
in Table 4. In the pooled sample we measure overall effects of covariates and how those change 
between 2001 and 2004. Column 1 reports without political variables. There, firm size effects 
change dramatically over time. In 2001 bribes as a fraction of costs decline with firm size, while 
in 2004 no such pattern exists, suggesting officials start to harass bigger firms relatively more.  In 
2001 exporters pay more bribes; by 2004 that effect seems to disappear. Only the marginal 
license effect is unchanged over time.  
What about the effect of the regime switch? In Table 4, a time dummy for 2004 is 
negative suggesting a 5.3 drop in bribes as a percent share of costs. In columns 2-5 we explore the 
political aspects. In column 2, we add in the vote/legislature share of PDIP-GOLKAR and that 
variable interacted with the 2004 time dummy. The base coefficient of -.14 suggests (under a 
non-“marginal” interpretation of Tobit coefficients) that in 2001 a 10% increase in PDIP-
GOLKAR vote share reduced the percent bribe ratio by 1.4. However the .30 coefficient on vote 
share interacted with time suggests that the net effect in 2004 is reversed and that a 10% vote 
share increase then led in net to a 1.6 percent bribe ratio increase in 2004.  
In columns 3-5 of the table, we attempt to correct for issues of simultaneity, to establish a 
causal link between bribing and assembly composition. But we note that with the small sample of 
districts in Table 4, IV results may be less compelling than later results based on larger samples. 
First we estimate a reduced form bribe equation, where we treat licenses as endogenous, 
determined by firm characteristics and politics and remove them as a covariate. Second we 
instrument as explained earlier for PDIP-GOLKAR vote share. Column 3 contains 2-step IV 
Tobit results14 ; column 4 2SLS results, and column 5 ordinary Tobit results for the reduced form 
specification. Note the base period PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient is now zero and insignificant, 
which is reassuring since there should be no causal effect of initial vote on initial corruption. For 
the 2-step Tobit the net effect increases from the .16 effect in column 2 to .19 (and more in the 
                                                 
14 The MLE version in this case did not converge, unlike in the rest of the paper. 
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ordinary Tobit in column 5). This number, .19, corresponds to the number, .20, we get for 
reduced form IV Tobit specifications for the later cross-sectional analysis. In general as expected, 
2SLS coefficients are lower all-round compared to Tobit ones. Note the instruments are strong 
and the Sargan test in column 4 is excellent; but the Wald test in column 3 fails to reject 
exogeneity of all covariates, a general issue we will discuss later.   
In Table 3 we again explore robustness of results. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, to the 
Table 4, column 5 formulation, we add respectively the district perceived average level of local 
government inefficiency in each time period and the district ln(GDP p.c.), as well as each 
interacted with the time dummy. The average efficiency variable interacted with time is 
significant suggesting that inefficiency in 2004 is associated with higher bribes. But in both cases 
PDIP-GOLKAR effects are little changed, netting at .20 and .21, compared to the column 5, 
Table 4 net effect of .22.15  
 
4. The Overall Effects of Politics on Local Corruption 
 
 In this section we identify local assembly composition effects from cross-sectional 
variation in bribing activity in 2004. Our primary results are for the reduced form specification 
based on equation (5), where we substitute in firm characteristics which determine licenses and 
visits. We have also a measure of transport costs of visits by local officials which affects the 
number of visits: the population weighted average of distance from villages in the firm’s sub-
district to the district capital. In examining results, our focus is on the vote share variable, which 
in this reduced form specification captures both direct effects on bribes and indirect effects 
through the number of visits and licenses. In the next section we will report results for the 
structural equation, where we have a weak instruments problem.  
The basic results are in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 report on the specification for red tape 
bribes to which the structural model reported in the next section applies most directly, showing 
IV Tobit (MLE) and then ordinary Tobit results. In columns 3-4, we present results on overall 
local corruption since that is the prime concern, adding in bribes for labor troubles to those for red 
tape. We focus on the effect of politics on total bribes. While we use a Tobit specification, for the 
political variable we report 2SLS results and footnote one set of full 2SLS results. 
                                                 
15 Entering these effects as simply one variable, either the change in district attitudes or change in income 
each interacted with a time dummy produces similar results (no effect on PDIP-GOLKAR effects). We also 
explored controlling for local culture and devoutness, as detailed in later sections, by adding in a variable, 
the ratio of Islamic to state elementary schools in 1990. That control has no effect here: the base school 
ratio coefficient (standard error) is -3.85 (4.37) and the ratio interacted with time has a coefficient of 3.62 
(6.08), implying in 2004 its net effect is zero. And its insertion raises the PDIP-GOLKAR net effect to .27. 
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In Table 5 for firm characteristics, there is a common pattern across columns. The red 
tape bribe ratio increases with firm employment up to about 120 employees (median 40; mean 
168) and increases over all ranges for the total bribe ratio. The bribe ratio increases initially with 
capital stock but peaks before the biggest firms, with bigger increases for total than red tape 
bribes. Labor bribes tend to affect bigger firms more. Being an exporter or having FDI has a weak 
positive effect on bribes. In these reduced form equations, Chinese entrepreneurs who face 
discrimination and have fewer opportunities for redress in general pay significantly more bribes, 
with the bribe ratio rising by 1.2 for red tape and a whopping 2.6 for overall bribes. In estimation, 
the cost of visit variable, distance from the plant’s sub-district to the district capital, has a weak 
effect. Industry dummies generally don’t matter. As we will see in the next two sections, the 
capital stock, export, FDI and being Chinese bribe effects mostly work indirectly through impacts 
on numbers of licenses, rather than directly affecting bribes.  
The pattern of legislature composition effects on bribing is consistent across columns. In 
columns 1 and 3, the IV coefficients are .15 and .20 for red tape and total bribes respectively and 
are 2-2.5 times larger than ordinary Tobit coefficients. We believe IV estimates of political 
effects are greater than non-IV ones because of the unobserved traditional, local “environment of 
corruption”, which acted to increase bribe levels. Figure 1 suggests that, if 2001 bribes reflect the 
tradition of corruption in a locality, this is negatively correlated with PDIP-GOLKAR 1999 vote 
share, biasing that coefficient downward.  
The .20 coefficient in column 3 on PDIP-GOLKAR corresponds to the .19 point estimate 
in the over-time comparisons in Table 3. Based on IV results (and a non-marginal interpretation 
to Tobit coefficients), a 10% increase in secular party assembly composition raises the total bribe 
ratio by 2.0% (with a mean overall bribe ratio of 3.4). The marginal Tobit effect is about 1.2, 
accounting for the probability of paying a bribe; this corresponds to the 2SLS effect of 1.3. These 
are large effects and constitute our basic result. Moreover the political effects in Table 5 are 
almost double those for the structural model in the next section; Table 5 results are a net 
combined effect: the direct effect of politics on bribing and the indirect effect of politics through 
changes in harassment and red tape. Political effects are viewed as varying continuously with 
vote shares (see Figure 2), but we report on experiments with non-linearity below.  
In terms of tests of the specification, while Wald-tests can’t reject exogeneity of 
covariates overall, the p-value is not large. And, while t-tests can’t reject equality of ordinary and 
IV Tobit coefficients for the political variable alone, t-values are not small-- 1.3 and 1.4 
respectively for red tape and all bribe comparisons. These results combined with our beliefs 
suggest that doing IV estimation is correct; but we also have two other pieces of evidence. First, 
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for a linear formulation accounting for heteroscedasticity, we performed a basic Hausman (1978) 
t-test in an OLS bribe equation on the coefficient of the usual added term: the residuals from the 
first stage regression of PDIP-GOLKAR on exogenous variables and instruments. That 
coefficient is always negative, consistent with our priors. For the all bribe equation, as formulated 
in Table 5, the t-statistic is still only -1.3; but for red tape bribes it is -3.13. Second, if we are less 
conservative in our instrumenting and add the percent Christian in the population in 1995 as a 
third instrument, in the IV Tobit formulation, the Wald p-value for red tape bribes in now at .05 
while for total bribes it is .13. More particularly, with greater precision in estimation, t-tests reject 
equality of IV and ordinary Tobit estimates in both cases. Sargan values in 2SLS estimation of 
this formulation suggest a less conservative instrumenting approach is valid for the specifications 
in Table 5: Sargan p-values in 2SLS either stay the same (all bribes) or actually rise (red tape 
bribes). 
Robustness 
In Table 6, we conduct two types of robustness tests concerning the magnitude of 
legislature composition effects. For these we report just the ones for all bribes; results for red tape 
bribes are similar. In the first set in Table 6a, we look at robustness of the Table 5 results to 
sample weights, specifications, and other considerations. In Table 6b, we look at the effect of 
adding in other covariates, representing a variety of district economic, social, and political 
conditions. Finally we have a discussion of non-linear specifications to political effects. 
Alternative specifications. Our sample of 2004 firms is non-random with over-sampling of firms 
in smaller districts and in a few of the districts that overlap with sample districts in 2001. We 
have not weighted in estimation and an issue is whether that affects results. We don’t know the 
relevant population of firms in 2004, to create exact weights, but we can try one plausible 
experiment to determine if weighting is a critical problem. To construct our basic sample, we 
drew on the census bureau’s [BPS] list of medium and large size firms (most firms over about 12 
employees) in 2003. But in over-sampling in districts with few firms, surveyors sometimes 
extended the sample into smaller size firms. In the experiment, we restrict the estimating sample 
to all firms over 12 employees (2272 of 2474) and use as weights our sample count relative to the 
BPS count in 2003 for each district, in estimating a weighted IV Tobit. Doing so in column 1 
raises the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient to .25.16   
                                                 
16 From the 2000 PODES, we have an inventory of all village activity including a count of all 
manufacturing enterprises as reported by village heads; these include some very small, “informal” sector 
firms that are well below the BPS and our horizon and have huge numbers. Nevertheless, based upon this 
count, we also estimate weighted IV Tobits. For these PODES weights, the coefficient of .199 falls to .153 
and remains significant. 
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In column 2, we treat firm characteristics such as size and FDI and export status as also 
endogenous, substituting in controls for local economic conditions that should determine firm 
characteristics—a measure of market potential, average employee compensation from the annual 
survey of manufacturers, indirect taxes (which are mostly local property taxes) over capital stock 
as a proxy for the local cost of capital, and the number of own industry enterprises as a source of 
local scale externalities. The first variable is from 1994 and the next three from 1997, where we 
use historical variables to mitigate issues of correlation with contemporaneous errors terms. 
Market potential is the distance discounted sum of GDP of the own and all other districts on 
Java.17  The first three variables are entered as a second order expansion. While scale externalities 
clearly matter, the variables in the second order expansion generally are weak statistically. 
Regardless, in column 3, now the IV vote share coefficient is .21, which is little different from the 
.20 in Table 5, suggesting the indirect effects of corruption through firm size are minimal.  
In the political process, we lumped PDIP and GOLKAR together, in part because we 
believe it is the total that matters. In column 3 we split the vote out and add a third instrument: the 
percent of the population that is Christian in 1995. In the split the PDIP coefficient is larger at .26 
and much more precisely estimated than the GOLKAR coefficient at .17. But for the same model 
run for red tape bribes alone, the PDIP and GOLKAR respective coefficients (standard errors) are 
.135 (.0573) and .200 (.116). The only conclusion we draw is that the PDIP effect is more 
precisely estimated. 
Finally, we turn to the issue that we have estimated a Tobit, imposing a common 
functional form on the decision of whether to bribe or not, and if so what ratio of bribes to pay, 
treating the problem as a simple censoring one. In column 4 of Table 6a, we show the results for 
the bribe equation for the sample where bribes are positive, estimated by 2SLS with a Heckman 
selection term based on a reduced form Probit. As in the rest of the table we focus just on the vote 
share coefficient, which is .115, consistent with the marginal effect of .12 on expected bribing 
activity in the Tobit framework. The selection coefficient is statistically significant. To get 
convergence in the bribe equation we had to drop industry, export and FDI dummies (which are 
never significant in continuous bribe formulations). In the (reduced form) selection equation we 
have the full set of firm characteristics as well as our instruments to control for politics.  
                                                 
17 In the sum, GDP in each district is discounted by .8ijAd , where ijd  is distance in 100’s of miles from the 
capital of the own district, i, to that of j. The .8 exponent is taken from Au and Henderson (2005). The A is 
given a value such that .8ijAd  is normalized to be one for the smallest own district. For the own district, 
following standard empirical practices the distance, iid , is 2/3 radius of the district, where that is the 
average distance “commuted” by any firm to the center (if all firms were uniformly spread over a circular 
district).  
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Other covariates. In Table 6b, we look at the effect on results of adding in other covariates. 
Except for the last column, we treat the added covariates as endogenous (with instruments 
footnoted in the table); but results differ little if they are treated as exogenous, in the sense that 
PDIP-GOLKAR coefficients still hover around .20 and the added covariates remain insignificant. 
First we look at the effect of “political competition”—how concentrated vote shares are. It could 
be that in districts where votes are more spread across parties, there is a greater degree of  
“competition” which induces, say, less corruption, because the governing coalition is more 
responsive to voters in its attempt to retain office. The degree of vote concentration is measured 
by a standard Hirschman-Herfindahl index: the sum of squared vote shares of each of the 40 
parties. The higher the index the more votes are concentrated. In column 1 this variable is positive 
as expected but insignificant, and only serves to raise the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient.  
In column 2 of the table, we add in average profitability of manufacturing firms from the 
Annual Survey of Medium and Large Size Firms in 2001, where profitability could raise bribes 
firms are willing to pay, and could be correlated with vote shares. That variable is also 
insignificant, with no effect on the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient. In column 3 we add in the count 
of manufacturing firms in the 2001 annual survey just noted. That count could reduce the cost of 
traveling to collect bribes or could better reflect long term productivity and local economic 
conditions. While that coefficient is positive, the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient again is unaffected. 
Then we add in the perceived district average efficiency in 2004 and ln(GDP p.c.) in 2003, 
variables used in Table 3 above. Again there are no significant effects. We also experimented 
with adding in the percent change in GDP p.c. from 1999 to 2003 and the change in district 
average inefficiency. The change in income has an insignificant negative sign and the change in 
inefficiency a positive insignificant one, with respective PDIP-GOLKAR coefficients (standard 
error) of .234 (.0953) and .194 (.0768).18 
In the last column we attempt to control for local “tastes” concerning corruption based on 
the notion that devout Muslims find corruption offensive. We don’t know devoutness of our 
owners, but we have districts characteristics that reflect local devoutness. The prime one noted 
earlier is the ratio of Islamic elementary schools to government schools, reflecting inculcation of 
religious practices as well as parental views. Once we control for tastes we add our third 
instrument, percent Christian, since it then readily passes our specification tests on its inclusion.   
In the last column the coefficient on the devoutness variable is negative but insignificant; the 
PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient is little changed at .196. The PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient also 
                                                 
18 Here when we instrument for the change in income from 1999-2003 we replace GDP p.c. 94 as an 
instrument with the percent change in GDP p.c. from 1994-1999 (partial F of 149). 
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remains in the neighborhood of .20 when we add in higher order terms of the school variable or 
add in another measure of devoutness combined with the school variable.19  
Non-linearities and discontinuities. We have relied on a linear specification to assembly 
composition effects. We settled on this after trying both regression discontinuity approaches and 
modeling non-linearities. In particular we tried a sharp discontinuity approach where in an 
ordinary Tobit we entered a cubic in vote shares and a dummy for when the PDIP-GOLKAR 
share tops 50%. We also did this for PDIP vote shares alone. In both cases the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for having a majority of assembly seats is insignificant and has the wrong sign 
(negative). We also looked at the 26 districts where PDIP-GOLKAR (and PDIP alone in 10 
districts) vote shares lie between 45 and 55%. Again a dummy variable for being over 50% is 
completely insignificant in both cases, with the wrong sign.  
Ordinary Tobit results from dividing PDIP-GOLKAR vote shares into a series of dummy 
variable categories (<40%, 40% to <50%, 50% to <60%, 60% to <70% and ≥ 70%) suggested a 
sharper jump in bribing as we move into the last two categories; although when allowing for a 
simple differential in slope coefficient beyond 50%, such an effect is zero. We then experimented 
in ordinary and IV Tobit estimation with quadratic and cubic formulations. A cubic doesn’t 
produce significant results. A quadratic specification has suggestive ordinary Tobit results 
[coefficients (standard errors) of -.241 (.161) PDIPGLKR + .00350** (.00172) PDIPGLKRsq.] 
but completely insignificant IV ones [coefficients (standard errors) of -.0617 (.322) PDIPGLKR 
+ .00321 (.00343) PDIPGLKRsq., with first stage F’s of 88 and 75]. In general there is not strong 
evidence of non-linearity and certainly no form that we are comfortable quantifying.   
 
5. The Anatomy of Bribing in 2004 
 
In the next two sections we turn to structural estimation results, looking first at the bribe 
equation and then equations for visits and licenses. We start with the structural version of 
equation (6) based on equation (2) for bribes paid by firms in 2004. We examine red tape bribes, 
                                                 
19 The second measure is the ratio of prayer-houses to mosques discussed in footnote 6. With a cubic in the 
school variable (which has insignificant coefficients), the PDIP-GOLKAR Tobit coefficient (standard 
error) [and 2SLS coefficient (standard error)] is .203 (.140) [.161 (.0715)]. With a quadratic in the school 
and the prayer-house variables, the results are .17 (.129) [.129 (.0686)]. Note as we add these district level 
terms with just 97 districts, at least Tobit errors tend to blow up. For the quadratic in tastes the coefficients 
(s.e.’s) are -5.18 (9.25) school ratio – 21.3 ( 14.9) school ratio squared -1.35* (.712) pray/mosq. ratio- 
.00108 (.0221) pray/mosq. ratio squared + 4.96** (1.36) school ratio*pray/mosq. ratio. The ratio of Islamic 
to state primary schools has a mean .26 and  s.d. .15 and the ratio of pray-houses to mosques has a mean 3.9 
and s.d. 2.7. 
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since the structural model is designed for those; the structural form results are even less precise 
for total bribes. In the structural model we treat visits as endogenous and licenses as pre-
determined. The specification is very simple. Controlling for visits and licenses, bribes as a 
fraction of costs are unrelated to most firm characteristics—industry, export activity, FDI 
investment, capital stock and the like. As we will see in Section 6, these items definitely create 
red tape and visits; but in this structural form, the bribe ratio is only related to overall scale which 
takes a quadratic form in employment. The bribe ratio seems unrelated also to firm cost and 
demand conditions such as the wage rate in the district and a measure of district market potential 
(see later); arguably these could affect bribes and costs in the same proportion leaving the ratio 
unchanged. Being Chinese has a positive, but insignificant effect in this table.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 present IV Tobit (MLE) and ordinary Tobit estimates, where 
in column 1 we instrument for visits with several variables. There are two travel cost variables 
facing officials visiting firms, starting with the distance from the sub-district of a firm to the 
district capital, discussed earlier. Second, coastal areas are viewed as more inaccessible, so we 
use the fraction of the population in a sub-district living in coastal villages as a second 
instrument. Then there are variables which seem to draw more excuses for visits, although not 
more bribes conditional on visits. These instruments are whether a firm is in “high tech” activity 
(machinery, electronics, transport, and instruments) or is an exporter. These four variables turn 
out to be are weak instruments. Their partial-F in first stage regressions for column 1 is 5.2; and 
that is the best it gets. That gives us the fundamental dilemma in estimation that led to our focus 
on a reduced form specification. We have weak instruments for visits; and trying to additionally 
instrument for licenses at the same time (also with weak instruments) produces unstable and non-
credible results. In Table 7, we present results assuming licenses are predetermined, largely in 
1999 and 2000, before the regime switch in 2001.  
In column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the number of visits (9.9) from the 
mean (6.6) increases the red tape bribe ratio by 2.4, where the mean red tape bribe ratio is 1.8 for 
the estimating sample. That coefficient in IV estimation is imprecisely estimated, although IV and 
ordinary Tobit results are quite similar. Increasing the number of licenses and retributions by one 
standard deviation (5.7) from the mean (8.1) raises the bribe ratio by 1.2, again a large effect. The 
bribe ratio peaks at a firm employment level of 26 in column 1. In general in the table, the bribe 
ratio starts to fall with firm size beyond some size at or below the median (40).    
In Table 7, in columns 3-4, we introduce the influence in a district of having voted for 
PDIP-GOLKAR. The IV Tobit coefficient is .0802 for the structural form model in this table 
compared to .146 for the reduced form red tape bribe equation in Table 5; and the corresponding 
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2SLS coefficient in this table is .0704 compared to .104 in Table 5. Reduced form coefficients are 
larger because they capture both direct and indirect effects on bribing. In Table 7, given the 
simultaneous attempt to instrument for visits, the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient in column 3 is 
insignificant. We note however that standard errors for MLE Tobit are based on clustering, which 
enlarges the standard errors as expected, but doesn’t allow for heteroscedasticity. In contrast the 
robust, clusterd standard errors for 2SLS for the same equation are relatively noticeably smaller. 
And the 2SLS coefficient is strongly significant, as reported in square brackets in the table. In 
general, this is a pattern throughout the work: the PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient under 2SLS tends 
to have a higher level of significance than under MLE Tobit.  
 
6. Harassment and Red Tape 
 
 In this section we look first at the second part of our corruption model: what determines 
the degree of harassment as measured by number of visits in equation (4). We estimate a 
“structural” version where licenses and retributions are treated as exogenous. Visits are 
determined by firm employment size, licenses and retributions, whether the firm exports, whether 
it is in a high tech industry, and cost of visit variables. Other firm characteristics seem to play no 
role in determining the number of visits. For the cost of visit variables, besides the population 
weighted average of distance from villages in the firm’s sub-district to the district capital used 
earlier, we add in the proportion of the population living in coastal areas in the sub-district (as 
raising transport costs) and a variable representing the ease of visiting multiple local plants, the 
ratio of total manufacturing establishments to land in the sub-district based on the PODES (an 
inventory of village characteristics collected every three years). After examining the structural 
relationship, we turn to the reduced form version where we add in firm characteristics that 
additionally determine licenses and retributions such as a more detailed industry breakdown, 
capital stock, and FDI status.  
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 report results on the structural model, with column 1 being 
the IV results when we instrument for party vote shares.  IV and ordinary Tobit results are 
virtually identical. Visits increase with the number of licenses, being a high tech industry, being 
an exporter, and with firm size up to 150 (about mean size and way above median size). The cost 
of visit variables have the correct signs throughout the table, but only the variable measuring the 
density of local manufacturing establishments is ever significant at even a 10% level. This reveals 
our problem with weak instruments in Table 7 above. Finally for the key variable, PDIP-
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GOLKAR vote shares, while the IV coefficient says that an increase in vote share of 10 points 
increases visits by .7 (from a mean of 7.4), the effect is not significant.  
In columns 3-4 when we remove the license variable in columns 1 and 2 and add in more 
firm characteristics, we see that capital stock size and being Chinese additionally significantly 
affect visits, indirectly through license requirements. Again IV and ordinary Tobit results are 
virtually the same. In this more reduced form version, the vote share coefficient is a little larger 
(.09 versus .07) and is significant at a 10% level in the ordinary Tobit estimates. The Wald test on 
exogeneity of covariates is far from rejecting exogeneity.  
Finally in Table 9 we turn to licenses and retributions, estimating relationships by OLS 
and 2SLS. Requirements increase monotonically with firm employment and capital stock size. 
Being Chinese or an exporter, or having FDI increases licenses and retributions firms face. The 
Chinese effect is surely a discrimination effect: Chinese are “intimidated” into subscribing to 
licenses that other firms typically would not be required to hold. Here again the need for 
instrumenting is unclear and PDIP-GOLKAR vote share coefficients while positive are not 
significant. From these results it would appear that license requirements depend on firm 
characteristics per se; and the effect of politics is at best small. Regardless, given PDIP-GOLKAR 
effects are positive in both Tables 8 and 9, we can see why in Table 5 versus 7, the effect of vote 
shares on bribes rises when we move to the reduced form and add in indirect effects of politics on 
visits and licenses. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 In Indonesia the introduction of local democracy is associated with decreased local 
corruption. However specific politics, separate from local devoutness and the traditional local 
corruption environment matter. Corruption falls in areas which vote more heavily for Islamic 
parties. As local vote shares and hence local legislature seat shares of secular parties rise, the 
relative degree of corruption rises. The baseline results suggest a secular party vote share increase 
of 10% raises the bribe ratio by 1.2 (marginal Tobit effect), where the mean ratio is 3.4. But an 
interesting aspect is that it appears voters in what became corrupt districts initially did not 
associate voting for secular parties with corruption. They were “fooled” in the first election cycle, 
but then responded by changing their votes towards Islamic parties in the next cycle.   
 These results based on local politics may provide optimism for reduction of corruption at 
the national level, in the long term. First, a change in local corruption environments surely 
impacts corruption at the national level per se. But the potential ability of Islamic parties to garner 
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political support based on anti-corruption stances raises the stakes at the national level. If secular 
parties over time do not clean house at the national level, then one or more of the Islamic parties 
may have enhanced chances of regaining dominance of the national political scene. Seeing voters 
turn to Islamic parties in the face of corrupt incumbent assemblies suggests that the political issue 
of corruption is a powerful one and may play out as (if) other Islamic countries democratize. 
However, while the current government in Indonesia has a focus on corruption reduction at the 
national level, people believe that the immediate prospects for substantial improvement are dim: 
corruption still serves to fund national political party activities and national bureaucrats still rely 
on corruption proceeds to supplement their salaries to meet market compensatory pay. 
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Table 1. The 2001 and 2004 comparison: 178 firms  
 2001 2004 
No. (out of 178) paying bribe for red tape 136 116  
[12 missing] 
If pay, bribe as % of costs:      mean 
                                                median 
8.04 
5 
4.53 
2 
No. of licenses 10.94 [lower 
bound] 
10.56 
Median time with local officials [Scale: 1 (0-5%), 
2 (5-15%),.6 (>75%)] 
2 1 
% paying labor bribes  n.a. 57 
[8 missing] 
If pay, labor bribe as % of costs  mean                      
                                             median 
n.a. 
n.a. 
5.2 
1.2 
(Unweighted) Avg. total bribe as % of costs, 
overall 
6.14 5.79  
Crude weighted avg. total bribes as share of total 
costs 
5.6 5.7 
 
 
Table 2.  Bribe or not, 2001 vs. 2004. “Fixed effects” logit; 178 firms in 24 districts.  
 
 Red tape 
bribe, or not 
Red tape 
bribe, or not 
Red tape+ labor 
bribe, or not 
Red tape + labor 
bribe, or not 
Small-medium size 
(500m -1b)  
.00924 
(.565) 
-.143 
(.655) 
-.204 
(.627) 
-.320 
(.651) 
Medium size  
(1b – 5b) 
-.0975 
(.714) 
(.0413 
(.755) 
-.212 
(.736) 
.286 
(.844) 
Large size  
(>5b) 
-.0549 
(.776) 
-.137 
(.854) 
-.225 
(.789) 
-.501 
(.954) 
Dummy: export or 
not 
1.13* 
(.635) 
.970 
(.667) 
1.17 
(.726) 
1.10** 
(.378) 
Ln (no. of licenses) 
 
.481** 
(.231) 
.592** 
(.286) 
.872** 
(.292) 
1.05** 
(.378) 
Time Dummy, 2004 
[D2004] 
-.967** 
(.347) 
-4.52** 
(1.52) 
-.831** 
(.362) 
-5.35** 
(1.72) 
D2004* share ’99 
PDIP-Golkar vote 
 .0652** 
(.0257) 
 .0830** 
(.0290) 
Control: no 
recorded ‘99 vote 
 yes  yes 
N [no. firms]  
{bribe ‘01 & no 
bribe ‘04} 
160  [80] 
{50} 
 
160  [80] 
{50} 
 
140  [70] 
{40} 
 
140  [70] 
{40} 
 
One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level. 
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Table 3. Overtime models: robustness to other covariates 
 
 Fixed effect 
logit (Table 
2, col. 4) 
Fixed effect 
logit (Table 
2, col. 4) 
Tobit: Pooled 
‘01-‘04 districts 
(Table 3, col. 5) 
Tobit: Pooled 
‘01 –’04 districts 
(Table 3, col. 5) 
PDIP-GOLKAR99   -.0627 
(.0708) 
-.0650 
(.0684) 
D2004* PDIP-
GOLKAR99 
.0871** 
(.0300) 
.0965** 
(.0314) 
.261** 
(.0731) 
.276** 
(.0686) 
Inefficiency (t) .242 
(.218) 
 -1.08 
(2.73) 
 
D2004* inefficiency(t)   7.31** 
(3.12) 
 
lnGDP p.c. (t)  -2.04 
(1.36) 
 .282 
(1.72) 
D2004* lnGDP p.c. (t)    .392 
(1.77) 
N 140 140 1862 1862 
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two 
a 5% level. 
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Table 4. Pooled sample, 2001 and 2004, manufacturing firms in 37 districts on Javaa 
a. In the covariates, a dummy is used to control for districts with no votes. From the discussion in the 
text, instruments are % government workers in 1990 and the fraction of the population living in 
villages on the coast in 2000, each interacted with the dummy for no votes. Then there is a second 
set of instrumental variables which is the first additionally interacted with the time dummy.  
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering (except for 2-step IV) and for 2SLS standard errors 
are robust ones accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% 
level. 
 Tobit Tobit IV Tobit 
(2-step) 
2SLS Tobit 
Small-medium size  
 
.741 
(1.46) 
.634 
(1.43) 
1.53 
(1.43) 
.841 
(1.49) 
1.53 
(1.80) 
         *D2004 
 
.597 
(1.89) 
.814 
(1.93) 
1.13 
(1.91) 
.436 
(1.49) 
1.12 
(2.02) 
Medium size 
 
-5.12** 
(1.79) 
-5.13** 
(1.86) 
-4.24** 
(1.45) 
-3.15** 
(1.55) 
-4.24** 
(2.27) 
         *D2004 
 
6.83** 
(2.31) 
7.20** 
(2.44) 
8.51** 
(1.89) 
4.85** 
(1.77) 
8.51** 
(2.75) 
Large size 
 
-6.03** 
(2.07) 
-6.05** 
(1.96) 
-6.20** 
(1.54) 
-4.43** 
(1.62) 
-6.06** 
(2.17) 
         *D2004 
 
6.35** 
(2.83) 
6.55** 
(2.80) 
10.7** 
(1.96) 
5.93** 
(1.59) 
10.5** 
(2.74) 
Export or not 
 
3.65** 
(1.43) 
2.88** 
(1.42) 
4.91** 
(1.14) 
3.79** 
(1.16) 
4.65** 
(1.49) 
         *D2004 
 
-3.07 
(1.91) 
-1.63 
(1.94) 
-2.79* 
(1.52) 
-2.73* 
(1.13) 
-2.48 
(1.59) 
Ln (no. licenses) 
 
5.67** 
(1.59) 
6.47** 
(1.64) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
         *D2004 
 
-.459 
(1.55) 
-1.86 
(1.69) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Time Dummy, 2004 
 
-5.30* 
(3.12) 
-18.8** 
(4.76) 
-16.9** 
(6.29) 
-12.4** 
(4.23) 
-21.5** 
(4.22) 
% share pdip & golkar 
vote ‘99 
 -.136** 
(.0416) 
.00721 
(.0741) 
.0467 
(.0809) 
-.0620 
(.0684) 
            *D2004  .301** 
(.0590) 
.200* 
(.115) 
.171** 
(.0823) 
.285** 
(.0709) 
Variance σ2    12.0** 
(.967) 
11.9** 
(.978) 
  13.0** 
(1.18) 
Control: no vote areas   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N [districts]   
{zeros} 
1677 [37] 
{484} 
1677 [37] 
{484} 
1862 [37] 
{582} 
1862 [37] 
{582} 
1862 [37] 
Wald-test: p-value   .84   
Sargan p-value    .97  
Partial F’s   175, 119 175, 119  
R2    .28  
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Table 5. “Reduced form” models of bribes 
 
 IV Tobit 
[MLE]; red 
tape bribesd 
Tobit: Red 
tape bribes 
IV Tobit 
[MLE]: All 
bribes 
Tobit: all 
bribes 
’99 vote : PDIP-GOLKAR 
[2SLS] 
.146** [.104**] 
(.0346)   [(.0708)] 
.0597** 
(.0205) 
.199** [.130**] 
(.0897)   [(.0493)] 
.0842** 
(.0369) 
Ln (employ) 2.53** 
(.633) 
2.50** 
(.622) 
2.68** 
(1.33) 
2.71** 
(1.32) 
Ln (employ) sq. -.263** 
(.0721) 
-.255** 
(.0694) 
-.175** 
(.145) 
-.175** 
(.141) 
Dummy: rent capital .535 
(.663) 
.379 
(.622) 
.994 
(1.29) 
.868 
(1.26) 
Capital size: 500m-1b 1.18** 
(.429) 
1.22** 
(.402) 
2.46** 
(.872) 
2.35** 
(.837) 
Capital size: 
1b-5b 
3.08** 
(.829) 
3.05** 
(.814) 
4.21** 
(1.22) 
4.06** 
(1.24) 
Capital size: 
5b-20b  
1.59** 
(.548) 
1.67** 
(.528) 
3.06** 
(.924) 
3.47** 
(1.00) 
Capital size:  
over 20b 
1.27 
(.850) 
1.29* 
(.762) 
1.02 
(1.36) 
1.79 
(1.40) 
Dummy FDI .767 
(.783) 
.838 
(.821) 
.831 
(1.18) 
1.24 
(1.26) 
Dummy export .540 
(.551) 
.249 
(.503) 
.596 
(.971) 
.108 
(.872) 
Dummy Chinese 1.17** 
(.528) 
1.34** 
(.484) 
2.61** 
(1.26) 
2.81** 
(1.04) 
Controls: no vote, ind. 
dummy, visit cost 
Yesab Yes Yesc Yes 
N [zeros] 2582 [1160] 2582 [1160] 2474 [932] 2474  [932] 
Variance σ2   [ρ]e 6.34** [-.101] 
(.505)    [(.0731)] 
6.36 
(.552) 
11.0    [-.116] 
(.751)    [(.108)] 
10.9 
(.812) 
Wald test: p-value  .16  .28  
Partial F’s: 1st stage 245  245  
Sargan p-value: 2SLS [.41]  [.84]  
R2: 2SLS  [.16]  [.195]  
a. There are 8 categories of industries. None of the 7 dummy variables have coefficients that are significant at 
10% or better level in column 1. 
b. From visit equation in Table 8, the control is avg. distance from villages in sub-district to district capital. 
The coefficient is always insignificant. 
c. Here wood [3.77 (1.93] is significant. 
d. 2SLS coefficients (standard errors) for column 1 variables are, in order, as follows: .104** (.0346); .808** 
(.346); -.100** (.0391); .184 (.307); .518** (.266); 2.02** (.580); .543 (.356); .523 (.511); .607 (.647); .151 
(.373); and .539* (.294). These coefficients are about 60% of column 1 coefficients.  
e. ρ’s are the correlation of the error terms between the main bribe equation and the equation for vote share. 
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering; and, for 2SLS, standard errors are robust ones 
accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level.  
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Table 6. Robustness: all bribes 
 
a. Alternative specifications 
 
a. The controls with coefficients (standard errors) are .946 (.562) ln (no. firms in own industry in district ’97) 
-29.5 (34.2) ln (MP: market potential ‘94) -33.6 (39.9) ln (wage97)+ 6387 (5777) prop. tax rate ’97  +.396 
(.871) ln (MP)sq +.237 (.487) ln (wage) sq. -15261 (20072) tax rate sq. +1.30 (1.76) ln (MP)*ln (wage) -
206 (276) ln (MP)*tax rate -119 (208) ln (wage)*tax rate. The mean (standard deviation) of ln (wage), ln 
(MP), and tax rate are respectively 8.53 (.858), 24.0 (.542), and .00465 (.00369). 
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering (except for 2-step IV); and, for 2SLS, standard errors are 
robust ones accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV weighted 
Tobit (MLE): 
BPS weights 
IV Tobit 
[MLE]a (fully 
reduced form) 
IV Tobit 
(2-step) : 
Vote split 
2SLS: Bribes>0, 
with selection 
correction 
Share ’99 vote PDIP-
GOLKAR 
.253** 
(.114) 
.210**    
[(.0718)] 
 .115** 
(.0541) 
Share ’99 vote: PDIP    .264**  
(.0992)   
 
Share ’99 vote 
GOLKAR 
  .166       
(.167)     
 
Dummies: industry  Yes Yes Yes No 
Visit cost control Yes Yes Yes No 
Dummies: FDI, export Yes No Yes No 
Firm labor and capital 
variables  
Yes No Yes Yes 
Dummy: Chinese Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District econ. controls No Yes No No 
Variance σ2   [ρ] 12.2   [-.183] 
(1.08)   [(.131)] 
11.0 [-.0510] 
(.807)  [(.096)] 
11.1 [-1.11, -.251] 
(.609) [(.701),( .482)]  
 
N [zeros] 2272 [817] 2477 [935] 2474    [932] 1511 
Wald test p-value  .16    .37 .28         
Selection λ:     -4.87** 
(1.81) 
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Table 6.  Robustness: all bribes (continued) 
 
b. Other covariates (added to Table 5, column 4 formulation)a 
 
 IV Tobit 
MLE 
IV Tobit 
MLE 
IV Tobit 
MLE 
IV Tobit 
MLE 
IV Tobit 
MLE 
IV Tobit 
MLEb 
Share ’99 vote PDIP-
GOLKAR    
.265**   
(.0949)   
.207** 
(.0824)    
.197** 
(.0774) 
.224** 
(.0947)  
.180**   
(.0780)  
.196* 
(.118) 
Political competition: HHI of 
vote shares 
18.6     
(25.3)    
     
Avg. profit: manu. firms in 
district, 2001 
 .182     
(.462)   
    
Ln (No. manu firms in 
district 2001)  
  .829 
(1.22)  
   
Perceived inefficiency dist. 
average 
   -3.44    
(5.76)   
  
ln (GDP p.c.)      .945  
(.692)  
 
Ratio: Islamic to state 
elementary schools 
     -.564 
(5.37) 
Wald  {Sargan (2SLS)}:p-
values 
.19 {.64} .38 {.76} .40 {.70} .34 {.69} .52 {.88} .35  {.47} 
Partial F, on added covariate 89.8 25.5 73.9 26.8 3708 n.a. 
  
a. Instruments for column (1) are % population living in coastal villages 2000, % pop Christian in 
1995, and % population government employees 1990. For columns (2) – (5), ln(dist. to Jakarta) 
and  ln(GDP p.c. 1994) are added as instruments. 
b. The 2SLS PDIP-GOLKAR coefficient (standard error) is .145 (.0602). 
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering; and, for 2SLS, standard errors are robust ones        
accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level. 
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Table 7. “Structural form” bribe equations: red tape bribes 
 
 IV Tobit 
MLEa 
Tobit IV Tobit 
(MLE)b 
Tobit 
Ln (no. of visits) 2.68(1) 
(.185) 
1.90** 
(.166) 
2.53(1) 
(2.81) 
1.88** 
(.244) 
Ln (no. licenses & 
retributions 
2.19** 
(1.05) 
2.62** 
(.294) 
3.00** 
(1.49) 
2.56** 
(.377) 
Ln(employ) 1.28 
(.869) 
1.56** 
(.578) 
1.36 
(1.09) 
1.55** 
(.608) 
Ln (employ) sq -.197** 
(.0816) 
-.220** 
(.0618) 
-.200** 
(.0964) 
-.216** 
(.0639) 
Share PDIP-GOLKAR 1999 
vote [2SLS] 
  .0802(2)  [.0704**] 
(.0598)      [(.0278)] 
.0334* 
(.0178) 
Dummy Chinese .558 
(.420) 
.587 
(.413) 
.426 
(.463) 
.549 
(.456) 
Controls: no vote   Yesc Yes 
N [zeros] 2517 [1126] 2517 [1126] 2517 [1126] 2517 [1126] 
Wald test: p-value .67  .52  
Variance σ2   [ρ’s] 6.18 [-.787] 
(.122)  [(1.85)] 
6.18 
(.122) 
6.20 [-.875, -.076] 
(.490) [(.818)  (.318)] 
6.16** 
(.549) 
Partial F’s: 1st stage regs. 5.18(1)  3.46(1) 
90.6(2) 
 
a. Instruments are (population weighted) avg. distance from villages in sub-district to district capital, % 
pop. in sub-district living in coastal villages, dummy export firm, dummy high tech firm.  
b. Instruments are those in (a) and  % government workers 1990 and fraction of population in villages on 
the coast in a district each interacted with the dummy for no vote areas. In this column under [ρ’s], we list 
the correlation of the error terms between the main bribe equation and the equation for vote share first and 
then next that for the main equation and the equation for visits. 
c. The no vote dummy has a coefficient of  4.03 (3.46) and the Jakarta dummy adds to that -.897 (.946).  
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering and for 2SLS standard errors are robust ones accounting 
for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level. 
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Table 8. The number of visits 
 
 IV Tobit (MLE) Tobit IV Tobit (MLE) Tobit 
’99 vote share: 
PDIP-GOLKAR 
.0681 
(.0720) 
.0343 
(.0270) 
.0904 
(.0829) 
.0518* 
(.0230) 
Ln (employ) 3.94** 
(.848) 
3.90** 
(.833) 
3.68** 
(.874) 
3.63** 
(.884) 
Ln (employ) sq.  -.392** 
(.0925) 
-.387** 
(.0910) 
-.280** 
(.0995) 
-.272** 
(.101) 
No. of licenses and 
retributions 
.562** 
(.0671) 
.568** 
(.0675) 
n.a. n.a. 
Dummy: rent capital n.a. n.a. -.0127 
(1.17) 
-.0950 
(1.13) 
Capital size:  
500m-1b 
n.a. n.a. 2.41** 
(.617) 
2.43** 
(.620) 
Capital size: 
1b-5b 
n.a. n.a. 3.21** 
(.993) 
3.19** 
(.957) 
Capital size: 
5b-20b  
n.a. n.a. 3.34** 
(1.15) 
3.34** 
(1.17) 
Capital size:  
over 20b 
n.a. n.a. 1.74 
(1.33) 
1.69 
(1.43) 
Dummy: Chinese .739 
(.773) 
.799 
(.878) 
1.18** 
(.946) 
1.26** 
(.975) 
Avg. distance from 
sub-dist. To capital 
-.0136 
(.0155) 
-.0153 
(.0152) 
-.00873 
(.0181) 
-.0105 
(.0168) 
% pop in sub-
district on coast 
-1.05 
(3.78) 
-1.58 
(3.16) 
-1.62 
(4.44) 
-2.24 
(3.86) 
District manu. 
enterprises/land 
1.61* 
(.915) 
1.47* 
(.848) 
1.11 
(.965) 
.942 
(.903) 
Dummy: high tech 2.69** 
(1.24) 
2.69** 
(1.22) 
n.a. n.a. 
Dummy: export 1.26* 
(.757) 
1.15 
(.712) 
2.07** 
(.809) 
1.96** 
(.756) 
Dummy: FDI n.a. n.a. -.254 
(1.22) 
-.190 
(1.19) 
No vote controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies no No Yes Yes 
Variance σ2   [ρ] 10.0  [-.0395] 
(.779)    [(.0744)] 
10.0 
(.847) 
10.2     [-.0447] 
(.779)     [(.0822)] 
10.2 
(.850) 
N [zeros] 2574 [303] 2574 [303] 2632 [309] 2631 [309] 
Wald test: p-value 0.60  .61  
 
Standard errors for Tobits are based on clustering; and, for 2SLS, standard errors are robust ones 
accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level. 
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Table 9. Number of licenses and retributions 
 
 2SLS  OLS  
’99 vote share: PDIP-GOLKAR .0506 
(.0429) 
.0252 
(.0172) 
Ln (employ) 
 
.744 
(.499) 
.506 
(.495) 
Ln (employ) sq. 
 
.0618 
(.0594) 
.0657 
(.0602) 
Dummy: rent capital 1.44** 
(.531) 
1.42** 
(.531) 
Capital size:  
500m-1b 
2.06** 
(.279) 
2.07** 
(.279) 
Capital size: 
1b-5b 
3.42** 
(.405) 
3.42** 
(.408) 
Capital size: 
5b-20b  
4.38** 
(.700) 
4.40** 
(.699) 
Capital size:  
over 20b 
6.00** 
(.604) 
6.00** 
(.614) 
Dummy: Chinese 1.15** 
(.471) 
1.20** 
(.482) 
Dummy: export 1.13** 
(.298) 
1.05** 
(.293) 
Dummy: FDI 1.87** 
(.669) 
1.88** 
(.666) 
Taste controls Yes Yes 
No vote controls Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
N 2540 2540 
Sargan p-value .996  
Partial F: 1st stage reg. 241  
R2 .494 .496 
 
For 2SLS, standard errors are robust ones accounting for clustering. One asterisk indicates a 10% 
significance level and two a 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Bribe patterns in 2001 versus 2004: PDIP-Golkar vote share in 1999 
a) (Unweighted) avg. of bribes as % of costs by district versus vote share 
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b) Fraction of firms paying bribes by district versus PDIP-Golkar vote share 
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Figure 2. 2004 Avg. bribe ratio by district versus PDIP-GOLKAR vote share in 
1999 
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Figure 3. Bribe activity in 2001 versus 2004 by district  
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Figure 4. Change in PDIP-GOLKAR support and bribe activity    
a) Change in bribe activity, 30 districtsa               
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a. To check that the relationship is not simply reflecting mean reversion (in voting) or changing economic 
conditions, we report the following regression (with an R2 = .36).    ∆ share PDIP-GOLKAR 04-99  
= -1.87 - 1.08** ∆ (bribe ratio 04-99) - .265** share PDIP-GOLKAR 99 + 7.26 % change GDP p.c. 
             (.425)                        (.112)          (6.40)   
b) 2004 bribe, activity all Java districts 
0
2
4
6
8
10
av
er
ag
e 
br
ib
e 
ra
tio
 in
 2
00
4
-30 -20 -10 0 10
change of percent votes for PDIP and Golkar between 2004 and 1999
average bribes Fitted values
Average bribes in 2004 and PDIP-GOLKAR votes
   
 
